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ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE AND 
EVIDENCE OF ABSENCE
Klaas J. Kraay
I defend the fi rst premise of William Rowe’s well-known arguments from evil 
against infl uential criticisms due to William Alston. I next suggest that the 
central inference in Rowe’s arguments is best understood to move from the 
claim that we have an absence of evidence of a satisfactory theodicy to the claim 
that we have evidence of absence of such a theodicy. I endorse the view which 
holds that this move succeeds only if it is reasonable to believe that (roughly) 
if there were such a theodicy, we would probably know it. Aft er conceding that there 
may be modest prima facie support for this latt er claim via the Principle of 
Credulity, I consider and reject four more ambitious arguments in its favour. 
I conclude that this necessary condition on Rowe’s crucial inference has not 
been shown to be satisfi ed.
I. Types of Theodicies and Rowe’s Argument
A theodicy is an account of some good, g, for the sake of obtaining which 
an omnipotent, omniscient being would be morally justifi ed in permitt ing 
some evil, e, to occur.1 Some theodicies, like the traditional soul-making 
theodicy, are patient-centred: they maintain that e’s permission is justifi ed 
by some g which, primarily, is good for the suﬀ erer. Others, like the tra-
ditional free will theodicy, are non-patient-centred: they maintain that e’s 
permission is justifi ed by some g which is not, primarily, good for the suf-
ferer. Typically, theists and non-theists agree that no non-patient-centred 
theodicy could be the whole of God’s reason for permitt ing some instance 
of suﬀ ering.2 
Many theodicies of both types involving known goods3 have been sug-
gested and discussed by philosophers: these are proposed theodicies. But, 
apart from these, it is at least conceivable there exist presently-unknown 
theodicies of each type: these are unproposed theodicies.4 Such theodicies 
might involve known goods, or they might involve goods not presently 
known. More speculatively, perhaps, there might be unknowable theodi-
cies, and these might involve known, unknown, or even unknowable goods. 
(The table below illustrates these categories.)5 And, it is at least conceiv-
able that somewhere within these categories there are philosophically-
defensible theodicies.6 
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Patient-Centred Theodicies Non-Patient-Centred Theodicies
Unproposed Proposed Proposed Unproposed
Unknowable Knowable Knowable Unknowable
Known 
goods
(7)
Known 
goods
(3)
Known 
goods
(1)
Known 
goods
(2)
Known 
goods
(4)
Known 
goods
(10)
Unknown 
goods
(8)
Unknown 
goods
(5)
Unknown 
goods
(6)
Unknown 
goods
(11)
Unknowable 
goods
(9)
Unknowable 
goods
(12)
William Rowe’s famous evidential argument from evil begins with the fol-
lowing claim concerning two appalling instances of suﬀ ering, E1 and E2.7
(P) No good state of aﬀ airs we know of is such that an omnipo-
tent, omniscient being’s obtaining it would morally justify that 
being’s permitt ing E1 or E2.8
This claim holds that there are no adequate theodicies in categories (1), (2), 
(3), (4), (7), and (10). From this premise, Rowe infers that, probably, 
(Q) No good state of aﬀ airs is such that an omnipotent, omniscient 
being’s obtaining it would morally justify that being’s permit-
ting E1 or E2.
This claim holds that there are no adequate theodicies in any of categories 
(1)–(12). Rowe maintains that if we are justifi ed in believing (Q) on the 
basis of our belief that (P), “then, since we see that (Q) would be false if 
[God] existed, we are justifi ed in believing that [God] does not exist.”9 This 
suggests that the argument should be completed as follows:
(R) If an omniscient, omnipotent, perfectly good being exists, 
some good state of aﬀ airs is such that an omnipotent, omni-
scient being’s obtaining it would morally justify that being in 
permitt ing E1 or E2.10
Therefore, probably,
 ~ (G) No omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good being exists.
The most controversial step in this argument is the inductive inference 
from (P) to (Q). In a 1996 paper, Rowe att empts to bypass this by arguing 
directly from (P) to ~(G).11 In what follows, when I refer to Rowe’s crucial 
inferences, I have both of these moves in mind. Before discussing them 
directly, however, I will fi rst examine some notable criticisms of (P) due to 
William Alston.
II. Alston’s Case Against (P)
Many theists agree that there are no adequate theodicies for E1 and E2 in 
categories (1) and (2).12 But William Alston has claimed that even if this 
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is so, nobody is justifi ed in believing (P), since it is possible that there are 
adequate theodicies for E1 and E2 somewhere in categories (3), (4), (7), 
and (10).13 It is important to see that Alston’s case against (P) is not an ap-
peal to the possibility of theodicies involving unknown goods: this would 
be irrelevant to (P), which concerns only known goods.14 Rowe misses this 
point when he says that “ . . . Alston concedes that he hasn’t shown that 
we cannot be justifi ed in believing that no good we know of justifi es God 
in permitt ing E1 and E2.”15 Alston concedes no such thing: his criticism of 
(P) is very much concerned with known goods. Moreover, Alston does not 
address whether we cannot be justifi ed in believing that no known good 
justifi es God in permitt ing E1 and E2; he means only to argue that we 
are not justifi ed in believing this.16 He defends the latt er claim by urging, 
modestly, that it is a logical or epistemic possibility that there are adequate 
theodicies for E1 and E2 somewhere in categories (3), (4), (7), and (10). 
Alston further claims, more ambitiously, that it is a live possibility that there 
are such theodicies. I will consider each strategy in turn.
Alston’s Modest Case Against (P)
Alston says that 
we are not warranted in supposing that the possible reasons we 
have been extracting from theodicies exhaust the possibilities for 
patient-centred reasons God might have for permitt ing Bambi’s or 
Sue’s suﬀ ering. Perhaps, unbeknownst to us, one or the other of 
these bits of suﬀ ering is necessary, in ways we cannot grasp, for 
some outweighing good of a sort with which we are familiar.17
This is a claim about unproposed, patient-centred theodicies involving 
known goods, and Alston explicitly extends it to both non-patient-centred 
theodicies and unknowable theodicies involving known goods. Alston’s 
position, then, is that there may be adequate theodicies for E1 and E2 in cat-
egories (3), (4), (7), and (10). In 1996, he returns to this point. He fi rst claims 
that there are unexperienced known goods,18 and that, since we have only a 
minimal grasp of such goods, for all we know they may be live candidates 
for adequate theodicies relevant to E1 and E2. From this speculation, he 
concludes that “we are in a bad position to determine whether the magni-
tude of the good is such as to make it worthwhile for God to permit a certain 
evil in order to make its realization possible”19 Alston takes this to show that 
we are not justifi ed in believing (P).
Alston’s other argument for this conclusion refers to the conditions of 
realization of known goods. Alston thinks it may be possible that certain evils 
(such as E1 and E2) are necessary conditions for the realization of goods 
with which we are familiar. If these goods are suﬃ  cient to justify God’s 
permission of E1 and E2, then there are theodicies for E1 and E2 in cat-
egories (3), (4), (7), and (10). Alston makes the point rather modestly in the 
following two passages:
I am not trying to show that there are conditions of realization that 
are unknown to us. On the contrary. By mentioning such putative 
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possibilities, I mean to indicate that we are not in a position to deter-
mine the extent to which there are such additional conditions and 
what they are. Hence we are in no position to assert, with respect 
to a given [known] good that is not disqualifi ed by a low degree of 
value, that a certain kind of suﬀ ering is not required for the realiza-
tion of that good. 
[O]ur grasp of the conditions of [some known good’s] realization may 
not be suﬃ  cient for us to say with justifi ed confi dence that God could 
have realized that good without permitt ing the evil in question and 
without making too much of a sacrifi ce of good (or prevention of 
evil) elsewhere in the [overall] scheme.20
Again, Alston takes these considerations to show that we are not justifi ed 
in believing (P).
Alston’s position seems to be this: since it is (1991, 1996) or may be (1996) 
possible that there are theodicies relevant to E1 and E2 in categories (3), 
(4), (7), and (10), we are not justifi ed in believing (P). On one plausible 
reading, then, Alston is committ ed to thinking that the logical possibility 
(1991, 1996) or epistemic possibility (1996) that there are such theodicies is 
suﬃ  cient to undercut our justifi cation for believing (P). But this seems 
extreme. Since Alston oﬀ ers no reason to think that this is a unique prob-
lem with respect to (P), it sounds as though he tacitly relies on general 
principles such as these:
If it is logically possible that there is an x, we are not justifi ed in 
believing that there is no x. 
If it is epistemically possible that there is an x, we are not justifi ed 
in believing that there is no x.21
But these principles are dubious: if the logical or epistemic possibility of 
there being an x were automatically to defeat our justifi cation for believing 
that there is no x, then—implausibly—we would not be justifi ed in as-
serting any negative existential claim (unless it concerned a state of aﬀ airs 
known to be impossible). I conclude that Alston’s modest case against (P) 
is unsuccessful.22
Alston’s Ambitious Case Against (P)
While the mere logical or epistemic possibility of there being an x cannot 
itself defeat the justifi cation for believing that there is no x, the situation is 
diﬀ erent with live possibilities: it is generally thought that the live possi-
bility of there being an x does (or at least could) undermine justifi cation for 
believing that there is no x. Alston oﬀ ers two arguments for the claim that 
it is a live possibility that there are unproposed adequate theodicies in-
volving known goods (theodicies in categories (3), (4), (7), and (10)):23 the 
argument from progress, and the argument from omniscience.24 The former 
appeals to the development of human knowledge throughout history: 
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The pervasive phenomenon of human intellectual progress shows 
that at any given time in the past there were many things not 
known or even conceived that came to be conceived and known at 
a later stage. The induction is obvious. It would be highly irrational 
to suppose that we have reached the limit of this process and have 
ascertained everything there is to be learned. This creates a pre-
sumption that with respect to values, as well as their conditions of 
realization, there is much that lies beyond our present grasp.25
There may well be a pervasive phenomenon of human intellectual prog-
ress. And this phenomenon may indeed create (or, bett er, motivate) the 
general fallibilist presumption that Alston has in mind. But Alston oﬀ ers 
no reason for thinking that this general fallibilist presumption is itself suf-
fi cient to support his highly specifi c claim that it is a live possibility that 
there are unproposed adequate theodicies for E1 and E2 involving known goods. 
And it is diﬃ  cult to see how any such general presumption could itself 
support such a particular claim.
That said, the following specifi c induction would be directly rele-
vant: suppose that human beings had a long history of discovering that 
previously-inscrutable evils were in fact conditions for the realization of 
some known goods which proved to be at the heart of some adequate theo-
dicy for those evils.26 This, I think, would motivate the specifi c presumption 
required: it would show it to be a live possibility that there are unproposed 
theodicies for E1 and E2 involving known goods. But, of course, no such 
history is recorded, so this cannot help Alston’s case.27 
Alston’s second argument (for the claim that it is a live possibility that 
there are unproposed theodicies relevant to E1 and E2 involving known 
goods) appeals to God’s omniscience:
our topic is not the possibilities for future human apprehensions [of 
known goods28], but rather what an omniscient being can grasp of 
modes of value and the conditions of their realization. Surely it is 
eminently possible that there are real possibilities for the latt er that ex-
ceed anything we can anticipate, or even conceptualize. It would be 
exceedingly strange if an omniscient being did not immeasurably 
exceed our grasp of such matt ers. Thus there is an unquestionably live 
possibility that God’s reasons for allowing human suﬀ ering may have 
to do, in part, with the appropriate connection of those suﬀ erings 
with [known] goods in ways that we have never dreamed in our 
theodicies. Once we bring this into the picture, the critic is seen to 
be on shaky ground in denying, of [E1 or E2], that God could have 
any patient-centred reason for permitt ing it, even if we are unable to 
suggest what such a reason might be.29 
I am sympathetic to the spirit of Alston’s move here, but his argument is 
unpersuasive. Certainly it is true that, if there were adequate unproposed 
patient-centred theodicies involving known goods (theodicies in catego-
ries (3) and (7)), an omniscient God would know this. But Alston wants 
to show that it is a live possibility that there are such theodicies, and the 
only support oﬀ ered for this claim seems to be his suggestion that ‘it is 
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eminently possible that there are real possibilities for’ what God can grasp 
of value that we cannot. This sounds like a shift  from mere logical (per-
haps even epistemic) possibility to live possibility.30 Since neither logical 
nor epistemic possibility entail live possibility, this move requires further 
support to be convincing. I conclude that neither Alston’s modest nor his 
ambitious case against (P) is successful. 
From (P) to (P’)
I take it, then, that Alston has failed to show that critics of theism do not 
justifi edly believe (P). But I agree with Alston’s claim that formulating the 
evidential argument in terms of (P) 
gives the false impression that the main problem is one of general-
izing to all goods from known goods, whereas the main problem is 
not that but rather the inference from “We cannot discern any way 
in which God would be morally justifi ed in permitt ing E1 or E2” to 
“There is no such way.”31
(P) gives this misleading impression because it is a broad claim concerning 
each of categories (1), (2), (3), (4), (7), and (10)—the categories concerned 
with known goods—even though the only evidence for (P) is the generally-
uncontested claim that there are no adequate theodicies for E1 and E2 in 
categories (1) and (2).
We might say, then, that (P) suppresses an important inference from a 
claim concerning categories (1) and (2) to a claim concerning categories 
(1), (2), (3), (4), (7), and (10). I have been criticizing Alston’s eﬀ orts to 
undermine this inference, but, while I believe them to be unsuccessful, 
this should not be construed as an endorsement of the inference. I believe 
that it will remain controversial, and for this very reason, it should be 
made explicit in the argument from evil. This is easily done by refor-
mulating (P) so that it no longer suppresses the inference in question: I 
propose to replace 
(P) No good state of aﬀ airs we know of is such that an omnipotent, 
omniscient being’s obtaining it would morally justify that being’s 
permitt ing E1 or E2.
with
(P’) We know of no good state of aﬀ airs’ being such that an omnipo-
tent, omniscient being’s obtaining it would morally justify that 
being’s permitt ing E1 or E2.32
While (P) claims that there are no satisfactory theodicies in categories (1), 
(2), (3), (4), (7), and (10), (P’) claims only that there are no satisfactory theo-
dicies in categories (1) and (2).33 From this generally-uncontested ground, 
then, defenders of Rowe’s earlier arguments can try to secure (Q), and 
thereby ~(G) via (R), or, in the spirit of Rowe’s later argument, defenders 
of Rowe can try to secure ~(G) directly. And, of course, critics of Rowe can 
try to block both moves.
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III. Absence of Evidence and Evidence of Absence
The inference from (P’) to (Q) is, I believe, best understood to move from a 
claim concerning the absence of evidence to a claim concerning the evidence 
of absence: (P’) contends that we have no evidence of a satisfactory theo-
dicy for E1 and E2, and this is thought to render probable the claim, (Q), 
that there just are no such theodicies. (Put another way, the inference gen-
eralizes from a claim concerning theodical categories (1) and (2) to a claim 
concerning all the theodical categories.) Similarly, Rowe’s later inference 
from (P’) directly to ~(G) is best understood to move from the absence of 
evidence of adequate theodicies directly to evidence of the absence (i.e., 
non-existence) of God.34 It is true, of course, that absence of evidence is 
neither identical to, nor entails, evidence of absence.35 But Rowe’s infer-
ences are obviously not meant to be deductive; and, if certain conditions 
are satisfi ed, the absence of evidence can give strong inductive support to a 
claim concerning the evidence of absence. In Section IV, I identify one such 
necessary condition with respect to Rowe’s inferences, and in the remain-
der, I claim that this condition has not been shown to be satisfi ed.
IV. A Necessary Condition on Rowe’s Inferences
Rowe fi rst defends the inference from (P) to (Q) with enumerative induc-
tion. He urges that
we are justifi ed in making this inference in the same way we are 
justifi ed in making the many inferences we constantly make from 
the known to the unknown. All of us are constantly inferring from 
the A’s we know of to the A’s we don’t know of. If we observe many 
A’s and all of them are B’s, we are justifi ed in believing that the A’s 
we haven’t observed are also B’s. If I encounter a fair number of pit 
bulls and all of them are vicious, I have reason to believe that all pit 
bulls are vicious.36 
(With respect to (P’), this argument can be understood as an enumera-
tive induction from the claim that we know of no adequate theodicies with 
respect to E1 and E2 to the claim that there are no such theodicies.) In 
response, Alston argues that the inference from (P) to (Q) is not a typical 
case of enumerative induction.37 He holds that “[t]ypically, when we gen-
eralize from observed instances, at least when we are warranted in doing 
so, we know quite a lot about what makes a sample of things like that a 
good base for general att ributions of the property in question,” and he 
suggests that we have no such knowledge in the relevant case.38  In terms 
of (P’), Alston’s position would be that we have no reason for thinking that 
our failure to fi nd adequate theodicies with respect to E1 or E2 is a good 
basis for concluding that there are no such theodicies. 
Rowe agrees that his initial defence of the inference from (P) to (Q) is 
inadequate.39 He concedes that this argument can establish only that (P) 
makes (Q) more probable than it would otherwise be, not that (P) renders 
(Q) more probable than not.40 And Rowe notes that showing this latt er claim 
is essential for showing that one is justifi ed in believing (Q) on the basis 
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of (P). Rowe does oﬀ er an argument for thinking that (P) makes (Q) more 
probable than not, but his argument depends on the undefended claim 
that Pr(P/G&k) = 0.5.41 Suppose, however, that Pr(P/G&k) is not just 0.5, 
but very high. This, as many theists have argued, would surely undercut 
the inference from (P) to (Q): it would show that one’s belief in (P) pro-
vides no strong support for belief in (Q).42 Accordingly, if Rowe’s inference 
is to go through, Rowe needs to show that it is reasonable to believe that 
Pr(P/G&k) is not high. I take it that the foregoing applies mutatis mutandis to 
the inference from (P’) to (Q): if this inference is to go through, Rowe needs 
to show that it is reasonable to believe that Pr(P’/G&k) is not high. Since 
Rowe oﬀ ers no such reason, his argument is insuﬃ  ciently-supported. 
As noted earlier, Rowe’s latest evidential argument att empts to bypass 
the troublesome inference from (P) to (Q): using Bayes’ Theorem, Rowe 
argues directly from (P) to ~(G).43 This move, then, is not from the absence 
of evidence of a satisfactory theodicy to evidence of the absence of one, 
but is instead a move from the absence of evidence of a satisfactory theod-
icy directly to the claim that God does not exist. Rowe concedes, however, 
that if Pr(P/G&k) were high, then (P) would not signifi cantly lower the 
probability of (G). Rowe replies to Wykstra’s argument for the claim that 
Pr(P/G&k) is high,44 but, as Bergmann correctly notes, this cannot show 
that Rowe’s argument succeeds: Rowe still bears the burden of showing 
that Pr(P/G&k) is not high:
The problem with Rowe’s [1996] argument is that he doesn’t clearly 
address the concern that P fails to provide signifi cant support for ~G. 
He seems to think that, in response to this worry, he needs to show 
only that we have no good reason to think Pr(P/G&k) is high (this is 
what he argues for in response to Wykstra). But that isn’t true. What 
he needs to show is that we have good reason to think Pr(P/G&k) is 
not high. Otherwise, he hasn’t shown us that P signifi cantly lowers 
the probability of G.45
In his recent reply to Bergmann, Rowe explicitly accepts this burden of 
proof: he agrees that the success of his new argument depends on there 
being good reason to think that Pr(P/G&k) is not high.46 And again, I take 
it that the foregoing applies mutatis mutandis to the inference from (P’) 
to ~(G): this inference can succeed only if it is reasonable to believe that 
Pr(P’/G&k) is not high.47 
V. Pr(P’/G&k) and Skeptical Defences of Theism
In order for Rowe’s arguments to persuade, then, we need some reason to 
believe that Pr(P’/G&k) is not high. In what follows, I argue that while this 
probability claim may be thought to enjoy limited prima facie plausibility, 
four more ambitious arguments in its defence fail. In recent years, the term 
skeptical theist has been applied to some of those who resist inferences like 
Rowe’s. But this term overdetermines the position, since one could of course 
resist these inferences without being a theist. For this reason, Howard-
Snyder prefers the expression skeptical gambit for the strategy, and (I presume) 
skeptical gambiteer for one who employs it. By itself, however, this locution 
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underdetermines the context, and so I propose to use the expression skeptical 
defender of theism (SDT) to refer to those who resist inferences like Rowe’s. 
But some further distinctions are needed, since there are various ways 
of so resisting. Let us say that a negative SDT claims that certain arguments 
for the claim that Pr(P’/G&k) is not high fail. This position, of course, is 
consistent with agnosticism concerning Pr(P’/G&k).48 A positive SDT, in 
contrast, claims that it is not the case that Pr(P’/G&k) is low. A modest posi-
tive SDT claims only this, but an ambitious positive SDT goes further by 
claiming that Pr(P’/G&k) is high.49 As will be evident, I position myself 
only as a negative skeptical defender of theism in what follows.
VI. Arguments for the Claim that Pr(P’/G&k) is Not High
So, those who endorse Rowe’s argument need to provide reason for think-
ing that Pr(P’/G&k) is not high, and there are various ways in which critics 
might respond. How might one show that Pr(P’/G&k) is not high? One 
modest approach is to claim that this judgement enjoys prima facie plausi-
bility. As Richard Swinburne notes, “[a] supreme principle which covers 
the justifi cation of belief . . . is surely the principle which has been called the 
Principle of Credulity—that, other things being equal, it is probable and so 
rational to believe that things are as they [epistemically] seem to be (and the 
stronger the inclination, the more rational the belief).”50 One might argue 
that the Principle of Credulity is relevant in this context: it just (epistemi-
cally) seems to us, some might say, that on G&k, it is not likely that we would 
know of no good state of aﬀ airs’ being such that an omnipotent, omniscient 
being’s obtaining it would morally justify that being’s permitt ing E1 or E2. 
Thus, via the Principle of Credulity, we are entitled to believe that, ceteris 
paribus, it is the case that on G&k, it is not likely that we would know of 
no good state of aﬀ airs’ being such that an omnipotent, omniscient being’s 
obtaining it would morally justify that being’s permitt ing E1 or E2. 
Those who want to resist the argument at this point may avail them-
selves of either an ambitious or a modest response. The former fl atly 
denies that the Principle of Credulity is appropriately deployed in this 
domain. A modal skeptic, for instance, might hold the general view that 
none of our intuitions about complex counterfactuals should even be 
deemed prima facie plausible.51 The latt er, more modest response concedes 
that the Principle of Credulity indeed yields prima facie reason to believe 
that Pr(P’/G&k) is not high, but claims that this amounts to very litt le.52 
For instance, one might argue that this prima facie plausibility is undercut 
or rebutt ed by the presence of some defeaters for this belief. 53 I note these 
moves only en passant: space does not permit their examination. Instead, 
since I suspect that defenders of Rowe would prefer stronger support 
(than that which may be conferred by the Principle of Credulity) for the 
claim that Pr(P’/G&k) is not high, I now turn to four more ambitious argu-
ments in defence of this claim. I show that they fail.
Epistemic Access to Known Goods and the Unlikelihood of Unknown Goods
Michael Tooley oﬀ ers an argument that can plausibly be construed to 
conclude that Pr(P’/G&k) is not high.54 This argument may be expressed 
as follows:
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(1) If some known property is good-making, then, probably, it appears 
so to us.
(2) It is probable that there are no unknown good-making properties.55
Therefore, probably, 
(3) Pr(P’/G&k) is not high.
In defence of premise (2), Tooley argues that the history of intellectual in-
quiry in the last few thousand years “does not consist in the recognition 
of more good-making and bad-making properties, or right-making and 
wrong-making properties. It consists, rather, in a gradually increasing 
ability on the part of humans to respond appropriately to those proper-
ties wherever they occur” (115). We have, Tooley thinks, discovered all 
the good-making properties we are likely to discover. This argument 
has been criticized. Daniel Howard-Snyder oﬀ ers a hypothetical ‘punc-
tuated equilibrium’ account of moral progress, on which our failure to 
discover new good-making properties in the last few thousand years is 
entirely unsurprising. Since we cannot rule out this account, Howard-
Snyder urges, our confi dence in (2) should be undermined.56 More tell-
ingly, Bergmann notes that the conclusion that we have discovered all 
the good-making properties we are likely to discover simply does not 
warrant (2).57 
What about Tooley’s fi rst premise? In order to motivate this claim, 
Tooley distinguishes knowledge of morality from knowledge in other 
areas of human inquiry:
In many areas, truth may well remain forever hidden from our gaze. 
In mathematics, one may contemplate a proposition, without even 
suspecting that it is a theorem, let alone discovering a proof of it. 
In physics, we may never arrive at a totally satisfactory theory of 
the physical world, with the result that we may be totally unable to 
describe the causes of events that are perfectly familiar to us. Can 
morality be just like that? Could there, for example, be some prop-
erty with which we were all perfectly familiar, which was of great 
moral signifi cance, but which never struck any human, at any time, 
as having any moral importance at all? Or could there be a property 
of states of aﬀ airs that was good-making, but which seemed to all 
humans, at all times, to be a bad-making property? Could there be a 
property of actions that was wrong-making, but which all humans 
fi rmly believed was right-making?58 
Clearly, Tooley thinks that these questions should be answered negatively, 
but he oﬀ ers no explicit argument for this doctrine of epistemic accessibil-
ity. He does explain, however, why he holds this view:
The main ground of this feeling, I think, lies in the idea, fi rst, that a 
property cannot be morally signifi cant in itself unless the belief that 
something has that property, or the belief that some possible state of 
aﬀ airs or action would have that property, has the power to aﬀ ect 
one’s motivation in certain ways, and secondly, that the belief that a 
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property is morally signifi cant in itself arises out of an awareness of 
the intrinsically-motivating quality of the relevant beliefs.59
These considerations strike me as incomplete at best.60 The fi rst claim 
seems to state a necessary condition on some property’s being morally 
signifi cant: a property is morally signifi cant only if the belief that some 
state of aﬀ airs has (or might have) that property has the power to aﬀ ect 
one’s motivation. But—even if such a connection exists—this has noth-
ing to do with epistemic transparency: no connection is here suggested 
between a property’s moral signifi cance and one’s awareness of that sig-
nifi cance. Tooley’s second consideration posits some (presumably causal) 
connection between the belief that a property is morally-signifi cant and 
the awareness of the motivating powers of beliefs concerning that property. 
But even if such a connection exists, this just does not show that we would 
likely be aware that our beliefs have the power to motivate. 
Further, even if Tooley’s premises were both well-supported and true, 
they would still provide only weak support for his conclusion. Recall the 
formulation of (P’):
(P’) We know of no good state of aﬀ airs’ being such that an omnipo-
tent, omniscient being’s obtaining it would morally justify that 
being’s permitt ing E1 or E2.
Tooley’s premises do not show that the probability of (P’) on (G) and k is 
low, because, even if we have signifi cant epistemic access to all goods, and 
even if it is unlikely that there are any unknown goods, we might still be 
unaware of myriad ways in which these known goods might feature in 
unproposed theodicies. 
Patient-Centred Restrictions on the Permission of Suﬀ ering.
Proponents of the evidential argument from evil sometimes stress the idea 
that certain known moral principles govern the permission of evil. Rowe, 
for instance, suggests that 
we normally would not regard someone as morally justifi ed in per-
mitt ing intense, involuntary suﬀ ering on the part of another, if that 
other were not to fi gure signifi cantly in the good for which that 
suﬀ ering was necessary.61
In a similar vein, Tooley suggests that 
it is morally permissible for an omnipotent and omniscient being to 
allow a morally innocent individual to suﬀ er only if that suﬀ ering 
will benefi t the individual in question, or, at least, if it is suﬃ  ciently-
likely that it will do so.62 
Let us call this the patient-centred restriction on the permission of suﬀ er-
ing.63
Tooley thinks that this restriction can be used to show that it is unlikely 
that a given instance of suﬀ ering is morally justifi ed, even if the theist 
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appeals to the possibility that the reason for the sake of which the evil is 
permitt ed is beyond our ken:
suppose that the [appeal to theodicies beyond our ken64] rests upon 
the idea that, if God exists, humans will have very limited knowl-
edge of certain non-moral facts—specifi cally, those concerning 
certain states of aﬀ airs that play an essential role in God’s grand 
plan for the world. Can this be the basis of a serious objection to 
the argument from evil? Suppose that certain intrinsically undesir-
able states of aﬀ airs are such that we cannot immediately detect 
the existence of any appropriately-related goods that would jus-
tify the evils in question. We apply our knowledge of the relevant 
moral principles to the situation, and conclude that there could 
be a good that would justify an omnipotent and omniscient be-
ing only if some condition C is satisfi ed. Perhaps we conclude, for 
example, that the evil in question can only be justifi ed if humans 
survive death, or if they have libertarian free will. Making use of 
the non-moral information we have, we then determine that while 
it is possible that C is true, it is very unlikely that this is the case. 
We therefore conclude that it is very unlikely that there is a morally 
suﬃ  cient reason for the evil in question.65
Tooley’s idea, then, is that if the reasons why God permits evils are beyond 
our ken, we should nevertheless expect a patient-centred condition C to 
be satisfi ed.66 Since it’s unlikely that such a condition is satisfi ed, Tooley 
concludes, it’s not reasonable to suppose that evils are permitt ed for the 
sake of reasons beyond our ken. While Tooley does not explicitly use these 
considerations to urge that Pr(P’/G&k) is not high, I believe that his re-
marks suggest just such an argument:67
AT: There are adequate theodicies relevant to E1 and E2 beyond our 
ken.
PCS: Patient-centred condition C is satisfi ed.68
(1) If (G & AT), then PCS.
(2) We know of no state of aﬀ airs’ being such that, in virtue of it, 
PCS.
Therefore, probably,
(3) ~PCS
Therefore, probably, 
(4) ~(G & AT)
Therefore, probably , 
(5) If G, then ~AT
This argument can be understood to support the claim that Pr(P’/G&k) 
is not high, so if it is a good argument, the necessary condition on the 
success of Rowe’s crucial inferences is satisfi ed. But note that this argu-
ment depends on the very sort of inference currently under dispute: the 
inference from (2) to (3). Why suppose, for instance, that our absence of 
evidence concerning some patient’s post-mortem recompense for suﬀ er-
ing justifi es belief in the absence of such recompense? In order to defend 
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the inference from (2) to (3), an argument is needed for the claim that 
Pr((2)/G&k) is not high. It is diﬃ  cult to imagine how such an argument 
could succeed, since this would involve showing not only that, probably, 
no known condition C is satisfi ed, and, in addition, that either there are 
no unknown conditions C, or that there are such conditions, but they are 
probably not satisfi ed. I conclude that—at minimum—this argument from 
patient-centred restrictions fails, since it objectionably relies on the very 
sort of inference it purports to defend.
Divine Silence
Michael Bergmann notices that Rowe oﬀ ers an argument which might be 
understood to support the claim that Pr(P’/G&k) is not high. Bergmann 
fi nds this argument in the following passage from Rowe:69
When God permits horrendous suﬀ ering for the sake of some good, 
if that good is beyond our ken, God will make every eﬀ ort to be con-
sciously present to us during our period of suﬀ ering, will do his best 
to explain to us why he is permitt ing us to suﬀ er, and will give us 
special assurances of his love and concern during the period of suﬀ er-
ing. Since enormous numbers of human beings undergo prolonged, 
horrendous suﬀ ering without being consciously aware of any such 
divine presence, concern, and explanations, we may conclude that 
if there is a God, the goods for the sake of which he permits horren-
dous human suﬀ ering are more oft en than not goods we know of.70
As Bergmann points out, Rowe appears to assume here that divine silence 
in the face of human suﬀ ering could not be justifi ed. This move should not 
be suppressed. One might make it explicit, and at the same time include it 
an argument for the claim that Pr(P’/G&k) is not high. This can be done in 
the following fashion, in the spirit of Rowe’s remarks:
S: There is divine silence.71
 SJ: There is some good that justifi es God in permitt ing divine silence.
AT:  There are adequate theodicies relevant to E1 and E2 beyond our 
ken.72
(1) If (G & AT) then (~S ∨ SJ )
(2) We know of no good state of aﬀ airs’ being such that an omnipo-
tent, omniscient being’s obtaining it would morally justify that 
being’s permission of divine silence.
Therefore, probably, 
(3) ~SJ
(4) S
Therefore, probably, 
(5) S & ~SJ
Therefore, probably, 
(6) ~(~S ∨ SJ )
Therefore, probably, 
(7)  ~(G & AT) 
Therefore, probably, 
(8)  If G, then ~AT
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This argument can be understood to support the claim that Pr(P’/G&k) 
is not high, so, again, if it is a good argument, the necessary condition on 
the success of Rowe’s crucial inferences is satisfi ed. But Bergmann rightly 
points out that this argument depends on the inference from (2) to (3), 
which is precisely the sort of inference under dispute.73 Rowe concedes as 
much in his reply to Bergmann.74 As displayed, then, this argument fails to 
provide independent support for thinking that Pr(P’/G&k) is not high. 
One way to avoid this problem is to establish (3) without using (2) as a 
premise. In his recent reply to Bergmann, this is just what Rowe att empts 
to do.75 Surprisingly, however, Rowe does not argue for SJ using diﬀ erent 
premises: instead, he urges that SJ is inherently implausible: “My reply is 
that [SJ] is an inherently implausible idea, not dependent for its implausibil-
ity on a prior rejection of one or more skeptical theses.”76 So Rowe, in eﬀ ect, 
asserts (3) without arguing for it. In my view, this move is unacceptable. 
For one thing, it is a conversation-stopper, because if the theist fails to just 
see this (alleged) inherent implausibility, no arguments can be oﬀ ered to 
help her see it.77 Worse, if this “inherent implausibility move” is deemed 
acceptable in this controversial context, it might just as well be deployed 
earlier in the philosophical conversation about evil: it might be suggested 
that it is inherently implausible that an adequate theodicy exists for some 
horrifi c instance of evil. Or, for that matt er, this move might be used at the 
outset of the discussion: it might be suggested that the very idea that God 
exists is inherently implausible. Such ‘short-circuiting’ moves are unlikely 
to impress the theist, nor should they. I conclude, then, that Rowe’s latest 
att empt to defend the claim that Pr(P’/G&k) is not high fails.
Ordinary Moral Reasoning
Michael Almeida and Graham Oppy recognize that the crucial step in the 
evidential argument from evil requires that it be reasonable to believe that 
Pr(P’/G&k) is not high.78 But they also claim that those skeptical of this 
probability-claim commit themselves to a reprehensible skepticism con-
cerning ordinary moral reasoning.79 Although not explicitly deployed in 
this manner, the argument may be taken as intending to oﬀ er indirect sup-
port for the claim that Pr(P’/G&k) is not high. Almeida and Oppy reason 
as follows:
Our central claim is that, if the considerations to which ‘sceptical 
theists’ appeal—considerations of human cognitive limitations in the 
realm of values (and perhaps elsewhere as well)—were alone suf-
fi cient to undermine the noseeum inference in evidential arguments 
from evil, then those considerations would also be alone suﬃ  cient 
to undermine familiar and ordinary kinds of moral reasoning. If the 
kinds of considerations to which sceptical theists appeal entail that 
we can assign no probability to the claim that there are great goods 
that are secured by the failure of a perfect being to prevent [E1 or 
E2], then the kinds of considerations to which sceptical theists ap-
peal also entail that we can assign no probability to the claim that 
there are great goods that are secured by our failure to prevent [E1 
or E2]. But if we assign no probability to the claim that there are great 
goods that are secured by our failure to prevent [E1 or E2], then we 
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cannot arrive at a reasoned view about whether or not to intervene 
to prevent [E1 or E2]. And that’s not an acceptable result.80
Almeida and Oppy illustrate their position by recasting their evidential 
argument from evil as an argument in favour of a human being’s interven-
ing to prevent some instance of evil, and then claiming that skepticism 
concerning such an inference is unreasonable.81 Their move may similarly 
be applied to my reconstruction of Rowe’s argument:
(P*) I know of no good state of aﬀ airs’ being such that my obtaining 
it would morally justify me in permitt ing E1 or E2.
(Q*) No good state of aﬀ airs is such that my obtaining it would mor-
ally justify me in permitt ing E1 or E2.
So, Almeida and Oppy are committ ed to the view that anyone skepti-
cal of the move from (P’) to (Q) should also be skeptical of the inference 
from (P*) to (Q*). And they see this as a fatal problem for the skeptical 
defender of theism, since they maintain that moral reasoning requires 
us regularly and confi dently to make inferences of just this form: “Our 
moral practice—our ordinary moral reasoning—shows that we do think 
it unlikely that there are goods beyond our ken which would justify us 
in not preventing [E1 or E2].”82 If we are unwilling inductively to infer 
(Q*) from (P*), then “there is a massive impediment to our reasoning to 
the conclusion that we ought to try to prevent [E1 or E2].”83 (This is why I 
treat their argument as an indirect argument for the claim that Pr(P’/G&k) 
is not high.)
Several replies to this line of argument may be imagined. First, it might 
be argued that, contra Almeida and Oppy, skepticism about the move 
from (P’) to (Q) need not lead to skepticism concerning the inference 
from (P*) to (Q*).84 But even if it does lead to such skepticism, one might 
plausibly claim that this is not problematic for the skeptical defender of 
theism, since our ordinary moral reasoning simply does not require in-
ductive inferences like (P*)–(Q*). This can be shown in two ways. An am-
bitious argument would show that inferences like (P*)–(Q*) simply are 
not persuasive, from which it follows that our ordinary moral reasoning 
(presumed here to be generally-successful) does not require them.85 But 
a modest argument will suﬃ  ce.86 Almeida and Oppy repeatedly suggest 
that inferences like (P*)–(Q*) are necessary conditions for the relevant sort 
of moral reasoning, but this can be denied. Specifi cally, this can be denied 
by oﬀ ering a model of the relevant sort of moral reasoning that does not 
require the (P*)–(Q*) inference. Here is one such model:87
(P*) I know of no good state of aﬀ airs’ being such that my obtaining it 
would morally justify me in permitt ing E1 or E2.
(S) I have no good reason to believe that there is a good state of af-
fairs such that my obtaining it would morally justify me in per-
mitt ing E1 or E2.88
(T) I have fulfi lled my relevant epistemic and moral duties in consid-
ering whether there might be a good state of aﬀ airs such that my 
obtaining it would morally justify me in permitt ing E1 or E2.
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(U) If (P*), (S), and (T), I am entitled to believe that I am not justifi ed 
in permitt ing E1 or E2.
Therefore,
(V)  I am entitled to believe that I am not justifi ed in permitt ing E1 or 
E2.
It seems to me that (V) secures the sort of moral reasoning that concerns 
Almeida and Oppy, and that this argument is plausible. If so (or if some 
other argument for the conclusion is plausible), then Almeida and Oppy 
are mistaken when they claim that our ordinary moral reasoning requires 
inferences like (P*)–(Q*). And if our ordinary moral reasoning does not re-
quire such inferences, this indirect argument for the claim that Pr(P’/G&k) 
is not high fails.89
VII. Conclusion
Rowe’s important evidential arguments from evil depend, respectively, on 
the inferences from (P) to (Q), and from (P) directly to ~(G). I have argued 
that William Alston’s criticisms of (P) fail, but that (P) should nevertheless 
be replaced with (P’), to bett er capture the spirit of Rowe’s inferences. The 
inference from (P’) to (Q), I have claimed, is a move from the absence of 
evidence of a satisfactory theodicy in categories (1) and (2) to the claim 
that no such theodicy exists in any of the twelve categories. Rowe’s later 
inference from (P’) directly to ~(G), I have suggested, is best understood 
to be a move from the absence of evidence of a satisfactory theodicy in 
categories (1) and (2) to the claim that God is absent (i.e., does not ex-
ist). Inferences from absence of evidence to evidence of absence can be 
persuasive, provided that certain conditions are satisfi ed. In this case, if 
Rowe’s inferences are to persuade, it must be reasonable to believe that 
Pr(P’/G&k) is not high. Rowe, as noted, concedes as much.
One might think that, given the Principle of Credulity, it is reasonable to 
suppose that this probability claim is prima facie plausible. (I mentioned, en 
passant, two ways in which the critic of Rowe’s argument might respond.) 
But surely the defender of Rowe’s argument would prefer stronger sup-
port for the claim that Pr(P’/G&k) is not high. I have considered and re-
jected four more ambitious arguments in defence of this claim, thereby 
oﬀ ering what I call a negative skeptical defence of theism. I take it, then, that 
a necessary condition on the success of Rowe’s central inferences has not 
been shown to be satisfi ed. If I am right to reject these four arguments, 
the defender of Rowe’s inferences has at least three possible avenues of 
response: she can (1) reject the claim that it must be reasonable to believe 
that Pr(P’/G&k) is not high for Rowe’s inferences to succeed; (2) concede 
that it must be reasonable to believe that Pr(P’/G&k) is not high, but argue 
that prima facie support for this claim via the Principle of Credulity is suﬃ  -
cient; or (3) oﬀ er new arguments for the claim that Pr(P’/G&k) is not high. 
I doubt, however, that any of these strategies is promising.90
Ryerson University
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NOTES
1. For simplicity, I will stipulate that such a good may also be the preven-
tion of an evil e2 such that, had e2 occurred, the world would have been worse 
oﬀ  (ceteris paribus) than it is given the occurrence of e.
2. More on this in Section VI, below.
3. I use this term in Rowe’s wide sense:
What counts as a “good we know of”? I do not mean to limit us to goods 
that we know to have occurred. Nor do I mean to limit us to those goods 
and goods that we know will occur in the future. I mean to include goods 
that we have some grasp of, even though we have no knowledge at all 
that they have occurred or ever will occur. (“The Evidential Argument 
from Evil: A Second Look,” in The Evidential Argument from Evil, ed. D. 
Howard-Snyder [Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1996], p. 264)
4. Many responses to the problem of evil turn on the possibility of there 
being philosophically-defensible—but yet unproposed—theodicies. 
5. This way of categorizing theodicies is suggested by remarks in William 
Alston, “The Inductive Argument from Evil and the Human Cognitive Condi-
tion,” in Philosophical Perspectives 5: Philosophy of Religion, ed. J. E. Tomberlin 
(Atascadero: Ridgeview Publishing Co., 1991), pp. 29–67. (Subsequent page 
references to this article will refer to the 1996 reprint in Daniel Howard-
Snyder’s The Evidential Argument from Evil [Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1996], pp. 97–125.) I thank Steve Wykstra for suggesting the terms ‘pro-
posed’ and ‘unproposed’ in place of ‘known’ and ‘unknown’.
6. I make no claim concerning whether these categories (actually or pos-
sibly) contain philosophically-defensible theodicies.
7. This argument is discussed in “Evil and Theodicy,” Philosophical Topics 
16 (1988), pp. 119–132; “Ruminations about Evil,” Philosophical Perspectives 5: 
Philosophy of Religion (1991), pp. 69–88; and “William Alston on the Problem of 
Evil,” in The Rationality of Belief and the Plurality of Faiths, ed. T. Senor, (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1994), pp. 71–93. 
E1 is the hypothetical example of a fawn, trapped in a forest fi re and horri-
bly burned, who suﬀ ers for days before dying. This example was introduced to 
the literature by Rowe in “The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism,” 
American Philosophical Quarterly 16 (1979), pp. 335–41. E2 is an actual case of a 
of a fi ve-year-old girl in Flint, Michigan, who was beaten, raped, and strangled 
to death by her mother’s boyfriend on New Year’s Day, 1986. This example was 
introduced into the literature by Bruce Russell, in “The Persistent Problem of 
Evil,” Faith and Philosophy 6 (1989), pp. 121–39.
8. In papers published in 1996 and 1998, (P) claims that there is no known 
good that justifi es God in permitt ing E1 and E2 (“A Second Look,” and “Reply 
to Plantinga,” Nous 34 [1998], pp. 545–52.) But Rowe takes pains to render this 
conjunctive formulation consistent with his earlier disjunctive version of (P) by 
allowing conjuctive goods:
Since we are talking about a good that justifi es God in permitt ing E1 
and E2, we should allow, if not expect, that the good in question would 
be a conjunctive good. Perhaps there is a good we know of that justifi es 
God in permitt ing E1. Perhaps there is a good we know of that justifi es 
God in permitt ing E2. If so, then we will allow that it is true that some 
good we know of (a conjunction of the goods in question) justifi es God 
in permitt ing E1 and E2. It should be obvious that I am trying to pose a 
serious diﬃ  culty for the theist by picking a diﬃ  cult case of natural evil, 
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E1 (Bambi), and a diﬃ  cult case of moral evil, E2 (Sue). Should no good 
we know of justify God in permitt ing either of these two evils, P is true. 
(“A Second Look,” p. 264)
9. “Evil and Theodicy,” p. 126. 
10. Rowe never explicitly defends anything like (R); he seems to take it 
for granted as a necessary truth. (See “A Second Look,” p. 284, note 22.) Many 
theists agree with (R)’s claim that the existence of God is inconsistent with the 
existence of any gratuitous evil, but there are noteworthy dissenters, such as 
John Hick (Evil and the God of Love, 2nd Edition [London: MacMillan Press, 
1973], pp. 333–36); Michael Peterson (Evil and the Christian God [Grand Rapids: 
Baker Book House, 1982], pp. 79–120); Peter van Inwagen (“The Problem of 
Air, the Problem of Evil, the Problem of Silence,” in The Evidential Argument 
from Evil, ed. D. Howard-Snyder, [Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 
1996], pp. 151–74); Keith Yandell (“Gratuitous Evil and Divine Existence,” Re-
ligious Studies 25 [1989], pp. 15–30); and William Hasker (“The Necessity of 
Gratuitous Evil,” Faith and Philosophy 9 [1992], pp. 23–44.)
11. “A Second Look,” p. 270.
12. Richard Swinburne is an exception. See his Providence and the Problem of 
Evil (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998).
13. “The Inductive Argument from Evil,” pp. 108–109; and “Some (Tempo-
rarily) Final Thoughts on Evidential Arguments from Evil,” in The Evidential 
Argument from Evil, ed. D. Howard-Snyder, [Indianapolis: Indiana University 
Press, 1996], pp. 324–25. On Alston’s view, categories (4) and (10) can at best 
provide partial reasons, since he thinks that no non-patient-centred good can 
provide the whole of God’s reason for the permission of E1 and E2 (“The In-
ductive Argument from Evil,” p. 111). A complete, adequate theodicy might 
be conjunctive, however, by employing elements from both the patient-centred 
and non-patient-centred columns.
14. Alston does appeal to the possibility of unknown goods, but this is 
relevant only to his eﬀ orts to undermine the inference from (P) to (Q): it is no 
part of his case against (P) itself. (“The Inductive Argument from Evil,” pp. 
108–109, 119; “Some (Temporarily) Final Thoughts,” p. 325).
15. “A Second Look,” p. 281. See note 8 for Rowe’s treatment of conjunctive 
goods.
16. “The Inductive Argument from Evil,” p. 110; “Some (Temporarily) Final 
Thoughts,” p. 325).
17. Ibid., p. 108–109 (emphasis added).
18. Such as, for Alston, the good of writing great poetry or the great good of 
experiencing complete felicity in the everlasting presence of God (“Some [Temporarily] 
Final Thoughts,” p. 324). For Rowe’s defi nition of a ‘known’ good, see note 3.
19. Ibid. 
20. Ibid., pp. 324, 325, respectively. (Emphasis added.)
21. There are, of course, many senses of ‘epistemically possible’. Here are 
three (with thanks to Mike Bergmann for helping to clarify matt ers here):
(a) P is epistemically possible iﬀ  we don’t know that ~P. (For all we 
know, P.)
(b) P is epistemically possible iﬀ  we don’t justifi edly believe ~P. (For all 
we justifi edly believe, P.)
(c) P is epistemically possible iﬀ  for all we know or justifi edly believe, 
P.
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On the fi rst—stronger—reading, the second principle I att ribute to 
Alston seems straightforwardly implausible, since it seems to imply that 
knowledge and justifi cation covary in this context:
If we don’t know that there is no x, we are not justifi ed in believ-
ing that there is no x.
On the second—weaker—reading, the principle becomes trivial:
If we don’t justifi edly believe that there is no x, then we are not 
justifi ed in believing that there is no x. 
Hence, on the third reading, the principle is either implausible or trivial.
22. Others have argued that positions like Alston’s lead to some form of 
inappropriate skepticism (Richard Gale, “Some Diﬃ  culties in Theistic Treat-
ments of Evil,” in The Evidential Argument from Evil, ed. D. Howard-Snyder, 
[Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1996], pp. 208–209; Bruce Russell, 
“Defenseless,” in The Evidential Argument from Evil, ed. D. Howard-Snyder, [In-
dianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1996], pp. 196–98; and David O’Connor, 
God and Inscrutable Evil, [Lanham: Rowman and Litt lefi eld, 1998], pp. 220–21) 
and these charges have not gone unanswered (see Michael Bergmann, “Skepti-
cal Theism and Rowe’s New Evidential Argument from Evil,” Nous 35 [2001], 
pp. 289–93; Alston “Some [Temporarily] Final Thoughts,” pp. 321–22; and Dan-
iel Howard-Snyder, “The Argument from Inscrutable Evil,” in The Evidential 
Argument from Evil, ed. D. Howard-Snyder, [Indianapolis: Indiana University 
Press, 1996], pp. 292–93). But this discussion typically concerns Alston-style 
worries about the inference from (P) to (Q), not Alston’s case against (P) itself. 
While it may be that the latt er argument “does not rely on a general skepticism 
about our cognitive powers, about our capacity to achieve knowledge and jus-
tifi ed belief” (Alston, “The Inductive Argument From Evil,” p. 121), his modest 
case does appear to rely on the implausible principles noted. 
23. While I am at present only interested in Alston’s case against (P), I 
should note that Alston takes the arguments from progress and omniscience 
to be relevant both to the rejection of (P) and to his eﬀ orts to block the inference 
from (P) to (Q). On the page immediately following these arguments in his 
1991 paper, he says: 
I have been arguing, and will continue to argue, that Rowe is not justifi ed 
in asserting P, since he is not justifi ed in supposing that none of the partic-
ular goods we have been discussing provide God with suﬃ  cient reason 
for permitt ing the suﬀ ering of Bambi and Sue. But even if Rowe were jus-
tifi ed in asserting P, what I have just been contending is that the inference 
from P to Q does not go through. (“The Inductive Argument from Evil,” 
p. 110, and see also “Some [Temporarily] Final Thoughts,” p. 325)
24. Daniel Howard-Snyder deploys similar arguments in his eﬀ ort to block 
the (P)–(Q) inference (“The Argument from Inscrutable Evil,” p. 301).
25. “Some (Temporarily) Final Thoughts,” p. 320. In his earlier paper, 
Alston puts the argument like this:
our cognitions of the world, obtained by fi ltering raw data through 
such conceptual screens as we have available for the nonce, acquaint us 
with only some indeterminable fraction of what there is to be known. 
The progress of human knowledge makes this evident. No one explic-
itly realized the distinction between concrete and abstract entities, the 
distinction between eﬃ  cient and fi nal causes, the distinction between 
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knowledge and opinion, until the great creative thinkers adumbrated 
these distinctions and disseminated them to their fellows. The devel-
opment of physical science has made us aware of a myriad of things 
hitherto undreamed of, and developed the concepts with which to grasp 
them—gravitation, electricity, electromagnetic fi elds, space-time curva-
ture, irrational numbers, and so on. It is an irresistable induction from 
this that we have not reached the fi nal term of this process, and that 
more realities, aspects, properties, structures remain to be discerned and 
conceptualized. And why should values, and the conditions of their re-
alization, be any exception to this generalization? A history of the appre-
hension of values could undoubtedly be writt en, parallel to the history 
just adumbrated, though the archeology would be a more diﬃ  cult and 
delicate task. (“The Inductive Argument from Evil,” p. 109)
This argument has been alleged to rely on a tendentious analogy between 
knowledge of science and knowledge of values (Rowe, “William Alston on the 
Problem of Evil,” p. 92 and Gale, “Some Diﬃ  culties,” pp. 209–10), and Alston 
has replied (“Some [Temporarily] Final Thoughts,” p. 320).
26. Swinburne considers this thought experiment in a diﬀ erent context 
(Providence and The Problem of Evil, pp. 28–29).
27. There may be, I suppose, a via media between Alston’s (plausible, but 
too general) fallibilist presumption motivated by the development of all hu-
man knowledge and the (suﬃ  ciently-specifi c, but implausible) fallibilist pre-
sumption motivated by the imagined development of human knowledge con-
cerning evils permitt ed for the sake of known goods. I suspect that any att empt 
to take this route will appear ad hoc and perhaps question-begging, but this 
remains to be seen: the burden of proof here is borne by defenders of Alston 
on this point.
28. Alston means this argument to apply to both known and unknown 
goods, but only the former is relevant to his criticism of (P). 
29. “The Inductive Argument from Evil,” p. 109 (emphasis added). 
30. In “William Alston on the Problem of Evil,” Rowe diagnoses several 
similar shift s elsewhere in Alston’s 1991 argument. 
31. “Some (Temporarily) Final Thoughts,” p. 322. See also pp. 315–16.
32. Michael Bergmann refers en passant to some worries concerning the 
formulation of (P), and suggests the following replacement:
(P*) No good we know of is known by us to justify an omnipotent, om-
niscient, perfectly good being in permitt ing E1 and E2 (“Skeptical 
Theism,” p. 294, note 9).
I take this to be oﬀ ered in the same spirit at my (P’). 
33. In personal correspondence, Rowe cautions me that (P’) may leave 
some readers with the impression that for all we know, there is no known good 
that we all know does not justify God in permitt ing E1 or E2. Rowe rightly 
urges that this impression would be misleading and objectionable, since we 
surely know of some known goods (such as Rowe’s enjoyment in smelling a 
fi ne cigar) that they do not justify God’s permission of E1 or E2. I agree that 
we know such things, and I am eager to avoid giving any impression to the 
contrary, but (P’) entails no such position, nor—in my view—should it leave 
anyone with this impression.
34. Wykstra vividly calls the former a noseeum inference (“Rowe’s 
Noseeum Arguments from Evil,” in The Evidential Argument from Evil, ed. 
D. Howard-Snyder, [Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1996], p. 126); 
Howard-Snyder characterises it as an inference from inscrutable evil to point-
less evil (“The Argument from Inscrutable Evil,” p. 291); and James Sennett  
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thinks of it as an inference from inscrutable evil to unjustifi ed evil (“The In-
scrutable Evil Defense Against the Inductive Argument from Evil,” Faith and 
Philosophy 10 [1993], pp. 220–29). One advantage of my slogan is that it ap-
plies equally to Rowe’s later argument.
35. This logical gap has been cited in arguments for modal conclusions: for 
example, the late Boston University astronomer Michael Papagiannis famous-
ly defended the possibility of UFOs and alien abductions on such grounds (C. 
D. B. Bryan, Close Encounters of the Fourth Kind: Alien Abduction, UFOs, and the 
Conference at M.I.T., [New York: Knopf, 1995], p. 230). More soberingly, ap-
peal to this logical gap also seems to have underwritt en much of the case for 
the recent war in Iraq: absence of evidence of weapons of mass destruction, 
we were told, did not constitute evidence of their absence. For representative 
remarks by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, see www.cbsnews.com/
stories/2003/08/08/iraq/main567410.shtml. 
36. “Evil and Theodicy,” pp. 123–24. 
37. Sennett  also criticises this argument, in “The Inscrutable Evil De-
fense.”
38. “The Inductive Argument from Evil,” p. 110. 
39. “William Alston on the Problem of Evil,” pp. 90–91, and “A Second 
Look,” p. 267.
40. Ibid., and “A Second Look,” p. 284, note 16.
41. “A Second Look,” p. 269. Constant k, of course, represents shared back-
ground knowledge. Rowe explains what is included in k as follows: 
I take it as important here that k be restricted almost entirely to informa-
tion that is shared by most theists and nontheists who have given some 
thought to the issues raised by the problem of evil. To this end, we will 
want to include in k our common knowledge of the occurrence of vari-
ous evils in our world, including E1 and E2, as well as our knowledge 
that the world contains a good deal of evil. k will also include our com-
mon understanding of the way the world works, the sorts of things we 
know to exist in the world, along with our knowledge of many of the 
goods that occur and many of the goods that do not occur. Of course, k 
will not include the information that God exists or the information that 
God does not exist. (“A Second Look,” p. 265)
42. See, for example, Alston (“The Inductive Argument from Evil”; “Some 
[Temporarily] Final Thoughts”); Sennett  (“The Inscrutable Evil Defense”); 
Howard-Snyder (“The Argument from Inscrutable Evil”); and Wykstra 
(“Rowe’s Noseeum Arguments from Evil”).
43. “A Second Look,” pp. 266–70. 
44. Wykstra’s argument is found in “Rowe’s Noseeum Arguments from 
Evil.”
45. “Skeptical Theism,” p. 281.
46. “Skeptical Theism: A Response to Bergmann,” Nous 35 (2001): p. 298 
and p. 303, note 6. Almeida and Oppy explicitly accept a similar burden of 
proof in their formulation of the evidential argument from evil, in “Sceptical 
Theism and Evidential Arguments from Evil,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 
81 (2003): p. 504.
47. In correspondence, Bruce Russell has suggested that he is now inclined 
to deny that this is a necessary condition: he claims that certain arguments 
from his “Defenseless” may be deployed in support of the view that it is not 
necessary to believe that that Pr(P’/G&k) is not high in order for Rowe’s infer-
ences to be persuasive. I will not consider this interesting objection here.
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48. Alston may be such an agnostic, and Howard-Snyder is too (see “The 
Argument from Inscrutable Evil,” p. 304). 
49. Judging by Wykstra’s claims in “Rowe’s Noseeum Arguments” (pp. 
136–37), he now is a modest positive SDT, but he used to be an ambitious posi-
tive SDT (in “The Humean Obstacle to Evidential Arguments from Suﬀ ering: 
On Avoiding the Evils of ‘Appearance,’” International Journal for Philosophy of 
Religion 17 [1984], pp. 73–94). Sennett  appears to be an ambitious positive SDT 
(“The Inscrutable Evil Defense,” p. 223). And Bergmann is a negative SDT (in 
“Skeptical Theism”).
50. Providence and the Problem of Evil, p. 20. Swinburne applies this prin-
ciple to the problem of evil by suggesting that it licences the inference from 
“Evil E appears to be gratuitous” to “Evil E is gratuitous,” unless there is either 
(a) strong positive evidence for the existence of God; or (b) a record of discov-
ering with respect to many apparently-gratuitous evils that a theodicy works 
with respect to them; or (c) a theodicy for each apparently-gratuitous evil (p. 
29). He defends (c) in the remainder of Providence and the Problem of Evil.
51. I take it that this might be Peter van Inwagen’s position, given the fol-
lowing claims (made in his related discussion of the problem of evil):
our modal intuitions, while they are no doubt to be trusted when they 
tell us that the table could have been placed on the other side of the room, 
are not to be trusted on such matt ers as whether there could be transpar-
ent iron or whether there could be a “regular” universe in which there 
were higher sentient creatures that did not suﬀ er. And if this is true, it is 
not surprising. Assuming that there are “modal facts of the matt er,” why 
should we assume that God or evolution or social training has given us 
access to modal facts knowledge of which is of no interest to anyone but 
the metaphysician? God or evolution has provided us with a capacity 
for making judgments about size and distance which is very useful in 
hunting mammoths and driving cars, but which is no use at all in as-
tronomy. It seems that an analogous restriction applies to our capacity 
for making modal judgments. (“The Problem of Evil, the Problem of Air, 
the Problem of Silence,” p. 162)
52. Alternatively, one might hold that, on refl ection, the apparent prima 
facie plausibility conferred here by the Principle of Credulity turns out to be 
illusory. (Thanks to Mike Bergmann for suggesting this.) 
53. Sennett , for example, explicitly concedes that there is prima facie sup-
port for the crucial inductive inference in Rowe’s argument, while rejecting 
the inference by means of defeaters (“The Inscrutable Evil Defense,” p. 224).
54. “The Argument from Evil,” Philosophical Perspectives, 5, Philosophy of 
Religion (1991), pp. 113–16, 125–27. 
55. This might be construed as tantamount to saying that the goods we 
know are a representative sample of the goods there are. At any rate, Rowe 
(“A Second Look,” p. 267, note 17) and Howard-Snyder (“The Argument from 
Inscrutable Evil,” p. 296) take it in this way. For some reservations concerning 
this interpretation of Tooley’s intent, see Bergmann (“Skeptical Theism,” pp. 
286–88).
56. “The Argument from Inscrutable Evil,” pp. 296–97.
57. According to Bergmann, Tooley’s argument for (2) “tells us only that 
the goods we currently know of are representative of the goods likely to be 
discovered by us. But no reason is given for thinking that the goods likely to 
be discovered by us are representative of the goods there are” (“Skeptical The-
ism,” p. 288).
58. “The Argument from Evil,” pp. 113–14. 
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59. Ibid., p. 114. 
60. In fairness, I should note that Tooley says that he “cannot att empt to 
argue the matt er here” (Ibid.).
61. “The Empirical Argument from Evil,” p. 244.
62. “The Argument from Evil,” p. 113. Rowe quotes this passage approv-
ingly (“William Alston on the Problem of Evil,” p. 92).
63. It is worth noting that many theists endorse the view that God’s rea-
sons for permitt ing evil cannot exclude those who suﬀ er. See, for example, 
Marilyn Adams (Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God, [Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1999], p. 31); Alston, (“The Inductive Argument from Evil,” 
pp. 111); Hasker, (“The Sceptical Solution to the Problem of Evil,” pp. 49–50); 
Eleonore Stump, (“Providence and the Problem of Evil” in Christian Philosophy, 
ed. T. Flint, [Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990], p. 66). But for 
doubts about this restriction from a theist, see van Inwagen, “The Magnitude, 
Duration, and Distribution of Evil: A Theodicy,” Philosophical Topics 16 (1988), 
pp. 161–87, and for a more general restriction, see Swinburne, Providence and 
the Problem of Evil, p. 235.
64. In this passage, Tooley refers to goods beyond our ken, but it is more 
precise to speak of theodicies beyond our ken (since, as explained in Section I, 
an unknown theodicy might involve a known good). 
65. “The Argument from Evil,” p. 127. Note that Tooley’s examples are 
more general than his patient-centred restriction would suggest: his examples 
concern humans surviving death, or having free will, but, strictly speaking, the 
patient-centred restriction should be indexed to a particular suﬀ erer. I take it, 
though, that Tooley means to say all humans in this passage, in which case this 
problem vanishes.
66. Although Tooley does not explicitly say so, I take it that condition C 
may be a conjunction of two or more patient-centred restrictions. (Thanks to 
Bill Hasker for pointing this out.) The burden of describing these restrictions 
in detail, of course, rests with the defender of the argument from evil. 
67. As I have expressed it, this argument is an abstract claim about some 
patient-centred condition C. Rowe oﬀ ers an argument about a specifi c example 
of a patient-centred restriction: he claims that any adequate theodicy for E2 
would involve the conscious experiences of the patient (“The Empirical Argument 
from Evil,” p. 244). Howard-Snyder replies to Rowe (in “The Argument from 
Inscrutable Evil,” pp. 295–96), as does Bergmann (in “Skeptical Theism,” pp. 
283–84). These replies are similar in spirit to my argument about condition C.
68. This is not a claim about patient-centred theodicies: in the passage quot-
ed, Tooley makes only weaker claim that suﬀ ering must (or, must likely) ben-
efi t the individual, not the stronger claim that the good for the sake of which 
the suﬀ ering is permitt ed must primarily involve the patient.
69. “Skeptical Theism,” p. 282. Strictly speaking, Rowe’s conclusion in this 
passage is not that Pr(P’/G&k) is not high. But Bergmann’s intention here is 
not to explicate Rowe precisely; instead, his goal is to harness Rowe’s consid-
erations in an argument for this conclusion.
70. “A Second Look,” p. 276. 
71. This should not be taken to suggest that God exists and is silent. Rather, 
S is shorthand for Rowe’s claim that “enormous numbers of human beings un-
dergo prolonged, horrendous suﬀ ering without being consciously aware of any 
such divine presence, concern, and explanations” (“A Second Look,” p. 276).
72. In the passage quoted, Rowe speaks only of goods beyond our ken, 
but, again, it is more precise to speak of theodicies beyond our ken (since, as 
explained in Section I, an unknown theodicy might nevertheless feature a 
known good). 
73. “Skeptical Theism,” p. 283. 
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74. “Skeptical Theism: A Response to Bergmann,” pp. 300–2. 
75. Ibid. 
76. Ibid, 302. Here is Rowe’s defence of this claim in full:
To suppose that God exists and divine silence is what occurs in response 
to the seemingly countless instances of horrendous suﬀ ering in our 
world is to suppose all of the following:
1. A being of infi nite wisdom and power is unable to prevent any of 
those instances of horrendous suﬀ ering without thereby forfeiting a 
good1 so great that the world would be worse without good1, even 
given the instance of horrendous suﬀ ering that must be permitt ed 
by the infi nitely powerful being if that being is to realize good1.
2. A being of infi nite wisdom and power is unable to enable those who 
undergo such horrendous suﬀ ering to understand just what the 
good1 is for which this infi nitely powerful being is required to per-
mit that horrendous suﬀ ering without this being thereby forfeiting a 
good2 so great that the world would be worse without good2, even 
given the additional suﬀ ering occasioned by the suﬀ erers being un-
able to understand what the good1 is for which an infi nitely power-
ful being permits them to undergo their horrendous suﬀ ering.
3. A being of infi nite wisdom and power is unable to be consciously 
present to those who suﬀ er horrendously, expressing his love and 
concern during their period of suﬀ ering for a good1 that is beyond 
their ken, without thereby forfeiting still another good, good3, such 
that the world would be worse without good3, even given the de-
spair and loneliness of those who undergo seemingly pointless 
horrendous suﬀ ering without any conscious sense of God’s being 
present, expressing his love and concern during their period of 
seemingly pointless suﬀ ering for a good1 that is beyond their ken.
4. A being of infi nite wisdom and power is unable to enable those who 
undergo horrendous suﬀ ering without any sense of God being con-
sciously present expressing his love for them to have any understand-
ing of just what the good3 is for which this being is required to permit 
them to suﬀ er without any conscious awareness of his love and con-
cern without thereby forfeiting still another good, good4, such that 
the world would be worse without good4, even given the additional 
suﬀ ering occasioned by the suﬀ erers and their loves ones being un-
able to understand what the good3 is for which an infi nitely powerful 
being permits them to undergo their horrendous suﬀ ering.
Now my position is that anyone who seriously refl ects on (1)–(4) will see the 
inherent implausibility in the idea that (1)–(4) is the way things are. . . . The 
skeptical theist, however, may agree with me about the implausibility of this 
idea. But she will say that its implausibility is derivative, not inherent. And 
she will argue that we take the idea to be implausible only because we are 
[objectionably] assuming that the way the goods we know of are related to the 
evils we know of is representative of the way the goods there are are related 
to the evils there are. . . . My reply is that the idea that (1)–(4) is the way things 
are is an inherently implausible idea, not dependent for its implausibility on a 
prior rejection of one or more skeptical theses.
77. Moreover, as Plantinga argues, if theism is true, it may not be fully 
rational to “just see” this alleged inherent implausibility (Warranted Christian 
Belief [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000], pp. 485ﬀ .).
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78. “Sceptical Theism,” p. 504.
79. An argument in this vein was earlier advanced by Russell (“De-
fenseless,” pp. 197–98) and replied to by Alston (“Some [Temporarily] Final 
Thoughts,” p. 321), Howard-Snyder (“The Argument from Inscrutable Evil,” 
pp. 292–93), and Bergmann (“Skeptical Theism,” pp. 291–93). Bergmann (pp. 
289–91) also considers related arguments concerning inappropriate skepti-
cism due to Russell (“Defenseless,” pp. 196–97) and Gale (“Some Diﬃ  culties,” 
pp. 208–209). Finally, Swinburne oﬀ ers an argument of this sort in Providence 
and the Problem of Evil (pp. 27–28), and Hasker defends Swinburne in “The 
Sceptical Solution to the Problem of Evil,” pp. 50–54. Space does not permit 
detailed consideration of these moves. My view, however, is that my response 
to the Almeida/Oppy argument can be deployed, mutatis mutandis, against 
these variants of the claim that skeptical defences of theism spell trouble for 
our ordinary moral reasoning.
80. “Sceptical Theism,” pp. 515–16. 
81. Ibid., p. 507. This suggests that Almeida and Oppy intend to opt for the 
second horn of the dilemma that Bergmann claims is faced by Russell’s similar 
argument (“Skeptical Theism,” p. 293).
82. Ibid., pp. 506–507. Almedia and Oppy refer only to goods beyond our 
ken, but this locution is shorthand: they intend it also to cover theodicies be-
yond out ken which involve known goods. (See p. 505, note 18.)
83. Ibid., p. 509.
84. Alston (“Some [Temporarily] Final Thoughts” p. 321) and Howard-
Snyder (“The Argument from Inscrutable Evil,” pp. 292–93) oﬀ er a reply in 
this vein to a similar argument advanced by Russell (in “Defenseless”). 
85. I take it that this move would be consistent with the spirit of Bergmann’s 
remarks (“Skeptical Theism,” pp. 292–93). In terms of the inference from (P*) 
to (Q*), the argument could be developed in the following manner: Given that 
Almeida and Oppy intend this inference perfectly to mimic the move from 
(P’) to (Q), and given that they agree that the latt er move succeeds only if it is 
reasonable to believe that Pr(P’/G&k) is not high, we can construct a similar 
necessary condition for the (P*)–(Q*) inference: it must be reasonable to believe 
that Pr(P*/~Q*&k) is not high. But, someone might say, it is just not reasonable 
to believe that this probability is not high. Hence it is not reasonable to infer 
(Q*) from (P*). Hence our ordinary moral reasoning (still presumed here to be 
generally successful) does not require such an inference.
Relatedly: in personal correspondence, Hasker suggests a defeater on the 
inference from (P*) to (Q*). He imagines that “a very wise and good person, 
one whom I have come to respect as a moral authority, tells me that I should 
not intervene to prevent the evil in question. I would then have good reason 
to think that there is some outweighing good that justifi es me in permitt ing the 
evil, but I would still have no idea what the good is. (To make this more com-
pelling, suppose that “I” am only ten years old at the time.)” In short, Hasker 
oﬀ ers a scenario on which, although it is reasonable to believe (P*), it may not 
be reasonable to infer (Q*). In my revised model of moral reasoning, below, I 
add a premise, (S), to cover cases of the sort Hasker imagines.
86. One could consistently advance both arguments.
87. Another model would replace “entitled” in (U) and (V) with “obliged.” 
Many more models may readily be imagined.
88. The motivation for this premise is explained in note 85.
89. Two replies to this argument may be envisioned. The fi rst suggests 
that the argument for (V) damages the skeptical theist’s case, since it may be 
retooled, in the following manner, to show that we are entitled to believe that 
God is not justifi ed in permitt ing E1 or E2:
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(P’) We know of no good state of aﬀ airs’ being such that an omnipotent, 
omniscient being’s obtaining it would morally justify that being’s 
permitt ing E1 or E2.
(S’) We have no good reason to believe that there is a good state of af-
fairs such that an omnipotent, omniscient being’s obtaining it would 
morally justify that being in permitt ing E1 or E2.
(T’) We have fulfi lled our relevant epistemic and moral duties in con-
sidering whether there might be a good such that an omnipotent, 
omniscient being’s obtaining it would morally justify that being’s 
permitt ing E1 or E2.
(U’) If (P’) and (S’) and (T’), then we are entitled to believe that no good 
state of aﬀ airs’ is such that an omnipotent, omniscient being’s ob-
taining it would morally justify that being’s permitt ing E1 or E2.
Therefore,
(V’) We are entitled to believe that no good state of aﬀ airs’ is such that an 
omnipotent, omniscient being’s obtaining it would morally justify 
that being’s permitt ing E1 or E2.
The problem with this argument, however, is that (U’) is false, or at the very least, 
unavailable to Almeida and Oppy: they intend to oﬀ er indirect support for the 
claim that Pr(P’/G&k) is not high precisely because they recognize that our entitle-
ment to believe that God has no good reason for permitt ing E1 and E2 requires 
more than our not knowing any such reason, our not knowing that there is any 
such reason, and our having looked carefully for such a reason. A more promis-
ing reply, I suppose, would be to claim that the argument for (V) is unsound, 
because (U) is false. For example, Almeida and Oppy might urge that one cannot 
justifi edly conclude (V) without fi rst inferring (Q*) from (P*). Alternatively, they 
might argue that (V) is inadequate to the task of underwriting the relevant sort 
of moral reasoning. I doubt, however, that such arguments can succeed. 
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Sobel for discussion of many issues germane to this paper, to Nathan Ballan-
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